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Abstract
Traditionally, consistency is the only criterion for the quality of a theory in logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions.
This work goes beyond that and contributes to the metatheory of actions by investigating what other properties a good domain
description should have. We state some metatheoretical postulates concerning this sore spot. When all postulates are satisfied we
call the action theory modular. Besides being easier to understand and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy’s sense, modular
theories have interesting properties. We point out the problems that arise when the postulates about modularity are violated, and
propose algorithmic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to overcome them.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In logic-based approaches to knowledge representation, a given domain is described by a set of logical formulas
T , which we call a (non-logical) theory. That is also the case for reasoning about actions, where we are interested in
theories describing particular actions (or, more precisely, action types). We call such theories action theories.
A priori consistency is the only criterion that formal logic provides to check the quality of such descriptions. In
the present work we go beyond that, and argue that we should require more than the mere existence of a model for a
given theory.
Our starting point is the fact that in reasoning about actions one usually distinguishes several kinds of logical
formulas. Among these are effect axioms, precondition axioms, and boolean axioms. In order to distinguish such non-
logical axioms from logical axioms, we prefer to speak of effect laws, executability laws, and static laws, respectively.
Moreover we single out those effect laws whose effect is ⊥, and call them inexecutability laws.
Given these types of laws, suppose the language is powerful enough to state conditional effects of actions. For
example, suppose that action a is inexecutable in contexts where ϕ1 holds, and executable in contexts where ϕ2 holds.
It follows that there can be no context where ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 holds. Now ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) is a static law that does not mention a.
It is natural to expect that ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) follows from the static laws alone. By means of examples we show that when
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consistent.
This motivates postulates requiring that the different laws of an action theory should be arranged modularly, i.e.,
in separated components, and in such a way that interactions between them are limited and controlled. In essence,
we argue that static laws may entail new effects of actions (that cannot be inferred from the effect laws alone), while
effect laws and executability laws should never entail new static laws that do not follow from the set of static laws
alone. We here formulate postulates that make these requirements precise. It will turn out that in all existing accounts
that allow for these four kinds of laws [1–6], consistent action theories can be written that violate these postulates.
In this work we give algorithms that allow one to check whether an action theory satisfies the postulates or not. With
such algorithms, the task of correcting flawed action theories can be made easier.
Although we here use the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [7], all we shall say applies as well to
first-order formalisms, in particular to the Situation Calculus [8]. All postulates we are going to present can be stated
as well for other frameworks, in particular for action languages such as A, AR [9–11] and others, and for Situation
Calculus based approaches. In [12] we have given a Situation Calculus version of our analysis, while in [13] we
presented a similar notion for ontologies in Description Logics [14]. The present work is the complete version of the
one first appeared in [15].
This text is organized as follows: after some background definitions (Section 2) we state some postulates concerning
action theories (Section 3). In Sections 4 and 5, we study the two most important of these postulates, giving algorithmic
methods to check whether an action theory satisfies them or not. We then generalize our postulates (Section 6) and
discuss possible strengthening of them (Section 7). In Section 8 we show interesting features of modular action
theories. Before concluding, we assess related work found in the literature on metatheory of actions (Section 9).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dynamic logic
Here we establish an ontology of dynamic domains. As our base formalism we use ∗-free PDL, i.e., PDL without
the iteration operator ∗. For more details on PDL, see [7,16].
Let Act = {a1, a2, . . .} be the set of all atomic action constants of a given domain. Our running example is in terms
of the Walking Turkey Scenario [4]. There, the atomic actions are load, shoot and tease. We use a as a variable for
atomic actions. To each atomic action a there is an associated modal operator [a]. Here we suppose that the underlying
multimodal logic is independently axiomatized (i.e., the logic is a fusion and there is no interaction between the modal
operators [17,18]).
Prop = {p1,p2, . . .} denotes the set of all propositional constants, also called fluents or atoms. Examples of those
are loaded, alive and walking. We use p as a variable for propositional constants.
We here suppose that both Act and Prop are nonempty and finite.
We use small Greek letters ϕ,ψ, . . . to denote classical formulas, also called boolean formulas. They are recursively
defined in the following way:
ϕ ::= p |  | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ → ϕ | ϕ ↔ ϕ.
Fml is the set of all classical formulas.
Examples of classical formulas are walking → alive and ¬(bachelor ∧ married).
A classical formula is classically consistent if there is at least one valuation in classical propositional logic that
makes it true. Given ϕ ∈ Fml, valuations(ϕ) denotes the set of all valuations of ϕ. We note |=CPL the logical conse-
quence in classical propositional logic.
The set of all literals is Lit = Prop∪ {¬p: p ∈ Prop}. Examples of literals are alive and ¬walking.  will be used
as a variable for literals. If  = ¬p, then we identify ¬ with p.
A clause χ is a disjunction of literals. We say that a literal  appears in a clause χ , written  ∈ χ , if  is a disjunct
of χ .
We denote complex formulas (possibly with modal operators) by capital Greek letters Φ1,Φ2, . . . They are recur-
sively defined in the following way:
Φ ::= ϕ | [a]Φ | 〈a〉Φ | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | Φ → Φ | Φ ↔ Φ
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composition of actions is defined by the abbreviation [a1;a2]Φ =def [a1][a2]Φ . Examples of complex formulas are
loaded → [shoot]¬alive and hasGun → 〈load; shoot〉(¬alive ∧ ¬loaded).
If T is a set of formulas (modal or classical), atm(T ) returns the set of all atoms occurring in T . For instance,
atm({¬¬¬p1, [a]p2}) = {p1,p2}.
For parsimony’s sake, whenever there is no confusion we identify a set of formulas with the conjunction of its
elements. The semantics is that for multimodal K [19,20].
Definition 1. A PDL-model is a tuple M = 〈W,R〉 where W is a set of valuations (alias possible worlds), and
R :Act −→ 2W×W a function mapping action constants a to accessibility relations Ra ⊆ W × W .
As an example, for Act = {a1, a2} and Prop = {p1,p2}, we have the PDL-modelM = 〈W,R〉, where
W = {{p1,p2}, {p1,¬p2}, {¬p1,p2}},
R(a1) =
{
({p1,p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1,p2}, {¬p1,p2}),
({¬p1,p2}, {¬p1,p2}), ({¬p1,p2}, {p1,¬p2})
}
,
R(a2) =
{({p1,p2}, {p1,¬p2}), ({p1,¬p2}, {p1,¬p2})}.
Fig. 1 gives a graphical representation ofM.
GivenM = 〈W,R〉, a ∈ Act, and w,w′ ∈ W , we write Ra instead of R(a), and wRaw′ instead of w′ ∈ Ra(w).
Definition 2. Given a PDL-modelM = 〈W,R〉, the satisfaction relation is defined as the smallest relation satisfying:
• |=Mw p (p is true at world w of modelM) if p ∈ w;
• |=Mw [a]Φ if for every w′ such that wRaw′, |=Mw′ Φ; and• the usual truth conditions for the other connectives.
Definition 3. A PDL-modelM is a model of Φ (noted |=M Φ) if and only if for all w ∈ W , |=Mw Φ .M is a model of
a set of formulas T (noted |=M T ) if and only if |=M Φ for every Φ ∈ T .
In the model depicted in Fig. 1, we have |=M p1 → [a2]¬p2 and |=M p1 ∨ p2.
Definition 4. A formula Φ is a consequence of the set of global axioms T in the class of all PDL-models (noted
T |=PDL Φ) if and only if for every PDL-modelM, if |=M T , then |=M Φ .1
We here suppose that the logic under consideration is compact [21].
Fig. 1. Example of a PDL-model for Act = {a1, a2}, and Prop = {p1,p2}.
1 Instead of global consequence, in [5] local consequence is considered. For that reason, a further modal operator  had to be introduced, giving
a logic that is multimodal K plus monomodal S4 for , and where axiom schema Φ → [a]Φ holds.
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types of formulas we use to describe dynamic domains.
2.2. Describing action theories in PDL
Before elaborating a theory, we need to specify what we are about to describe, i.e., what the formulas talk about.
Following the tradition in the literature, we identify a domain (alias scenario) with the actions we take into account
and the fluents they can change. More formally, we have:
Definition 5. A domain signature is a tuple 〈Act,Prop〉.
An example of a domain is the well-known Yale Shooting Scenario (YSS) [22], whose signature comprises the
actions load, wait and shoot, and fluents loaded and alive.
Given a domain 〈Act,Prop〉, we are interested in theories whose statements describe the behavior of actions of
Act on the fluents of Prop. PDL allows for the representation of such statements, that we here call action laws. We
distinguish several types of them. We call effect laws formulas relating an action to its effects. Statements of conditions
under which an action cannot be executed are called inexecutability laws. Executability laws in turn stipulate the
context where an action is guaranteed to be executable. Finally, static laws are formulas that do not mention actions.
They express constraints that must hold in every possible state. These four types of laws are our fundamental entities
and we introduce them more formally in the sequel.
2.2.1. Static laws
Frameworks which allow for indirect effects of actions make use of logical formulas that state invariant propositions
about the world. Such formulas delimit the set of possible states. They do not refer to actions, and we suppose here
that they are expressed as formulas of classical propositional logic.
Definition 6. A static law is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml.
In our running example, the static law walking → alive says that if a turkey is walking, then it must be alive.
Another one is saved ↔ (mbox1∨mbox2), which states that an e-mail message is saved if and only if it is in mailbox 1
or in mailbox 2 or both [23].
In some action languages, such as AR for example, we would write the statement always alive → walking, and in
the Situation Calculus it would be the first-order formula
∀s.(Holds(walking, s) → Holds(alive, s)).
The set of all static laws of a given domain is denoted by S . At first glance, no requirement concerning consistency
of S is made. Of course, we want S to be consistent, otherwise the whole theory is inconsistent. As we are going to
see in the sequel, however, consistency of S alone is not enough to guarantee the consistency of a theory.
2.2.2. Effect laws
Logical frameworks for reasoning about actions contain expressions linking actions and their effects. We suppose
that such effects might be conditional, and thus get a third component of such laws.
In PDL, the formula [a]Φ states that formula Φ is true after every possible execution of action a.
Definition 7. An effect law2 for action a is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ , where ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml, with ψ classically consistent.
The consequent ψ is the effect which obtains when action a is executed in a state where the antecedent ϕ holds.
An example of an effect law is loaded → [shoot]¬alive, saying that whenever the gun is loaded, after shooting the
2 Effect laws are often called action laws, but we prefer not to use that term here because it would also apply to executability laws that are to be
introduced in the sequel.
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walking. For parsimony’s sake, the latter effect law will be written [tease]walking.
Note that the consistency requirement for ψ makes sense: if ψ is inconsistent then we have an inexecutability law,
that we consider as a separate entity and which we are about to introduce formally in the sequel. On the other hand, if
ϕ is inconsistent then the effect law is obviously superfluous.
For the first example above, in action languages one would write the statement
shoot causes¬alive if loaded,
and in the Situation Calculus formalism one would write the first-order formula
∀s.(Holds(loaded, s) → ¬Holds(alive,do(shoot, s))).
2.2.3. Inexecutability laws
We consider effect laws with inconsistent consequents as a particular kind of law which we call inexecutability
laws. (Such laws are sometimes called qualifications [24].) This allows us to avoid mixing things that are conceptually
different: for an action a, an effect law mainly associates it with a consequent ψ , while an inexecutability law only
associates it with an antecedent ϕ, viz. the context which precludes the execution of a.
Definition 8. An inexecutability law for action a is of the form ϕ → [a]⊥, with ϕ ∈ Fml.
For example ¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥ expresses that shoot cannot be executed if the agent has no gun. Another
example is dead → [tease]⊥: a dead turkey cannot be teased.
In AR we would write the statement impossible if ¬hasGun, and in the Situation Calculus our example would be
∀s.(¬Holds(hasGun, s) → ¬Poss(shoot, s)).
2.2.4. Executability laws
With only static and effect laws one cannot guarantee that the action shoot can be executed whenever the agent has
a gun. We need thus a way to state such conditions.
In dynamic logic the dual 〈a〉ϕ, defined as ¬[a]¬ϕ, can be used to express executability. 〈a〉 thus reads “execution
of action a is possible”.
Definition 9. An executability law for action a is of the form ϕ → 〈a〉, where ϕ ∈ Fml.
For instance hasGun → 〈shoot〉 says that shooting can be executed whenever the agent has a gun, and  →
〈tease〉, also written 〈tease〉, establishes that the turkey can always be teased.
Some approaches (most prominently Reiter’s) use biconditionals ϕ ↔ 〈a〉, called precondition axioms. This is
equivalent to ¬ϕ ↔ [a]⊥, which highlights that they merge information about inexecutability with information about
executability. Here we consider these entities to be different and keep them separate.
In action languages such laws are not represented, they are rather implicitly inferred from inexecutability statements
(cf. Section 7). In Situation Calculus our example would be stated as
∀s.(Holds(hasGun, s) → Poss(shoot, s)).
Whereas all the extant approaches in the literature that allow for indirect effects of actions contain static and effect
laws, and provide a way for representing inexecutabilities (in the form of implicit qualifications [2,4,25]), the status
of executability laws is less consensual. Some authors [3,4,26,27] more or less tacitly consider that executability laws
should not be made explicit but rather inferred by the reasoning mechanism. Others [1,2,5,6] have executability laws
as first class objects one can reason about.
It seems a matter of debate whether one can always do without executabilities. In principle it seems to be strange
to just state information about necessary conditions for action execution (inexecutabilities) without saying anything
about its sufficient conditions. The justification is that given an action we have three possible situations: it is known
to be executable, known to be inexecutable, and unknown whether executable. This is the reason why we think that
we need executability laws. Indeed, in several domains one wants to explicitly state under which conditions a given
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And if we have a plan such as load; shoot (load followed by shoot) of which we know that it achieves the goal ¬alive,
then we would like to be sure that it is executable in the first place!3 In any case, allowing for executability laws gives
us more flexibility and expressive power.
2.2.5. Action theories
Given a domain 〈Act,Prop〉, for an action a ∈ Act, we define Ea as the set of its effect laws, X a the set of its
executability laws, and Ia that of its inexecutability laws.
Definition 10. An action theory for a is a tuple 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉.
In our running scenario example, a theory for the action shoot would be
S = {walking → alive}, E shoot = {loaded → [shoot]¬alive},
X shoot = {hasGun → 〈shoot〉}, Ishoot = {¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥}.
Given a dynamic domain we define
E =
⋃
a∈Act
Ea, X =
⋃
a∈Act
X a, and I =
⋃
a∈Act
Ia.
All these sets are finite, because Act is finite and each of the Ea , X a , Ia is finite.
Definition 11. An action theory is a tuple of the form 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉.
Given an action theory 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and a formula Φ , we write S ,E ,X ,I |=PDL Φ instead of S ∪ E ∪ X ∪
I |=PDL Φ .
When formalizing dynamic domains, we face the frame problem [8] and the ramification problem [28]. In what
follows we formally present the logical framework in which action theories will henceforth be described.
2.3. Dynamic logic and the frame problem
As the reader might have already expected, the logical formalism of PDL alone does not solve the frame problem.
For instance, if 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 describes our shooting domain, then
S ,E ,X ,I |=PDL hasGun → [load]hasGun.
The same can be said about the ramification problem in what concerns the derivation of indirect effects not properly
caused by the action under consideration. For example,
S ,E ,X ,I |=PDL ¬alive → [tease]alive.
Thus, given an action theory 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉, we need a consequence relation powerful enough to deal with the frame
and ramification problems. This means that the deductive power of PDL has to be augmented in order to ensure that
the only non-effects of actions that follow from the theory are those that are really relevant. The presence of static laws
makes that this is a delicate task, and starting with [2,3], several authors have argued that some notion of causality
is needed. In this work we opt for the dependence-based approach presented in [5], which has been shown [29] to
subsume Reiter’s solution to the frame problem [30], and moreover at least partially accounts for the ramification
problem [31].
In the logical framework developed in [5], metalogical information, given in the form of a dependence relation, is
added to PDL.
Definition 12 (Dependence relation [5]). A dependence relation is a binary relation⊆ Act × Lit.
3 Of course this would require a solution to the qualification problem [24].
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=
{ 〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
,
which means that action shoot may make the literals ¬loaded, ¬alive and ¬walking true, and action tease may make
walking true.
Semantically, the dependence-based approach relies on the explanation closure assumption [26], and its solution to
the frame problem consists in a kind of negation as failure: because 〈load,¬hasGun〉 /∈, we have load ¬hasGun,
i.e., ¬hasGun is never caused by load. Thus, in a context where hasGun is true, after every execution of load, hasGun
still remains true. We also have tease  alive and tease ¬alive. The meaning of all these independences is that the
frame axioms hasGun → [load]hasGun, ¬alive → [tease]¬alive and alive → [tease]alive hold.
We assume that is finite.
A dependence relation defines a class of possible worlds models:
Definition 13. A PDL-modelM = 〈W,R〉 is a-model if and only if whenever wRaw′ then:
• if a  p, then |=Mw p implies |=Mw′ p; and
• if a ¬p, then |=Mw p implies |=Mw′ p.
Fig. 2 depicts the dependence-based condition on models.
Given a-modelM, Φ and T , |=M Φ and |=M T are defined as in Definition 3.
Definition 14. A formula Φ is a -based consequence of the set of global axioms T in the class of all -models
(noted T |= Φ) if and only if for every-modelM, if |=M T , then |=M Φ .
In our example it thus holds
S ,E ,X ,I |= hasGun → [load]hasGun
and
S ,E ,X ,I |= ¬alive → [tease]¬alive.
In this way, the dependence-based approach solves the frame problem. However, it does not entirely solve the
ramification problem: while indirect effects such as loaded → [shoot]¬walking can be deduced with |= without
explicitly stating that in the set of effect laws for shoot, we nevertheless still have to state indirect dependences such
as shoot¬walking. However, according to Reiter’s view:
“what counts as a solution to the frame problem [. . .] is a systematic procedure for generating, from the effect laws,
[. . .] a parsimonious representation for [all] the frame axioms” [32].
Fig. 2. Dependence-based condition: preservation of literal ¬p under hypothesis a  p.
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We comply with that as we can define a semi-automatic procedure for generating the dependence relation from
the set of effect laws [33]. Moreover, as it has been argued in [23,31], our approach is in line with the state of the
art because none of the existing solutions to the frame and the ramification problems can handle domains with both
indeterminate and indirect effects.
In the next section we turn to a metatheoretical analysis of action theories and make a step toward formal criteria
for theory evaluation. Before that, we need a definition.
Definition 15. Let 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 be an action theory for a, and a dependence relation. ThenM = 〈W,R〉 is the
big (alias maximal/standard) model for 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and if and only if:
• M is a-model;
• W = valuations(S ) (all valuations of S ); and
• Ra = {(w,w′): for all ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ Ea ∪ Ia, if |=Mw ϕ, then |=Mw′ ψ}.
For an example, consider an action theory whose components are given by
S = ∅, Ea = {p1 → [a]¬p2}, X a = {〈a〉},
Ia = {p2 → [a]⊥}, and = {〈a,¬p1〉, 〈a,¬p2〉}.
Fig. 3 depicts one of its models and its associated big model.
Big models contain all valuations consistent with S . Clearly, for a big modelM we have |=M S ∧Ea ∧Ia . Because
M maximizes executability, it is only X a which might not be true inM.
In the rest of the paper we characterize when an action theory with a dependence relation has a big model.
3. The postulates
“When does a given action theory have a model?”, and, more importantly, “is that model intended?” are questions
that naturally arise when we talk about action theories. Here we claim that all the approaches that are put forward in
the literature are too liberal in the sense that we can have satisfiable action theories that are intuitively incorrect. We
argue that something beyond the consistency notion is required in order to help us in answering these questions.
Our central thesis is that the different types of laws defined in Section 2.2 should be neatly separated in modules.
Besides that, we want such laws to interfere only in one sense: static laws together with action laws for a may have
consequences that do not follow from the action laws for a alone. The other way round, action laws should not allow
to infer new static laws; effect laws should not allow to infer inexecutability laws; action laws for a should not allow
to infer action laws for a′, etc. This means that our logical modules should be designed in such a way that they are as
specialized and as little dependent on others as possible.
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complish our goal, we have to diminish interaction among such modules, rendering them the least interwoven we can.
The rest of the section contains postulates expressing this. We here only state the postulates, and defer explanations
and discussions to Sections 4–6.
PC (Logical consistency): S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ⊥.
The theory of a given action should be logically consistent.
PS (No implicit static laws):
if S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ, then S |=CPL ϕ.
If a classical formula can be inferred from the action theory, then it should be inferable from the set of static laws
alone. (Note that on the left we use the -based consequence, while on the right we use consequence in classical
logic: as both S and ϕ are classical, ϕ should be inferable from S in classical logic.)
PI (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥, then S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥.
If an inexecutability law for an action a can be inferred from its action theory, then it should be inferable in PDL
from the static laws and the inexecutability laws for a alone. Note that we used |=PDL instead of |= because we
also suppose that neither frame axioms nor indirect effects should be relevant to derive inexecutability laws. The same
remark holds for the postulate that follows:
PX (No implicit executability laws):
if S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → 〈a〉, then S ,X a |=PDL ϕ → 〈a〉.
If an executability law for a can be inferred from its action theory, then it should already “be” in X a , in the sense
that it should also be inferable in PDL from the set of static and executability laws for a alone.
Postulate PC is obvious, for we are interested in consistent theories. It can be shown that PX is a consequence of
PS (see Corollary 41).
Thus, while PC is obvious and PX can be ensured by PS, things are less obvious for Postulates PS and PI: it turns
out that for all approaches in the literature they are easily violated by action theories that allow to express the four
kinds of laws. We therefore study each of these postulates in the subsequent sections by means of examples, give
algorithms to decide whether they are satisfied, and discuss about what to do in the case the answer is ‘no’.
4. No implicit static laws
While executability laws increase expressive power, they might conflict with inexecutability laws. Consider, for
example, the following action theory:
S1 = {walking → alive}, E1 =
{ [tease]walking,
loaded → [shoot]¬alive
}
,
X1 =
{〈tease〉}, I1 = {¬alive → [tease]⊥}
and the dependence relation:
=
{ 〈shoot,¬loaded〉, 〈shoot,¬alive〉,
〈shoot,¬walking〉, 〈tease,walking〉
}
.
From this description we have the unintuitive inference X tease1 ,I tease1 |=PDL alive: the turkey is immortal! This is an
implicit static law because alive does not follow from S alone: 〈S ,E tease,X tease,I tease〉 violates Postulate PS.1 1 1 1 1
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based approaches and in causal laws theories. To witness,4 suppose in Lin’s framework we have
Holds(p1, s) → Caused(p2, true, s) (1)
and
Caused(p2, false, s). (2)
Then from (2) we get
¬Holds(p2, s) (3)
and then conclude
¬Caused(p2, true, s). (4)
Finally, from (1) and (4) we get
¬Holds(p1, s)
which is an implicit static law.
To see how implicit static laws show up in McCain and Turner’s causal laws approach [3], let the causal law ϕ ⇒ ψ
and T = {¬ψ}. Then ¬ϕ is an implicit static law in such a description.
How can we find out whether an action theory for a with a dependence relation satisfies Postulate PS?
Theorem 16. 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and satisfy Postulate PS if and only if the big model for 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and is a
model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and.
Proof. LetM = 〈W,R〉 be the big model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and.
(⇒): AsM is a big model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and, we have |=M S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia . It remains to show that |=M X a .
Let ϕi → 〈a〉 ∈ X a , and let w ∈ W be such that |=Mw ϕi . Therefore, for all ϕj ∈ Fml such that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |=
ϕj → [a]⊥, we must have |=Mw ϕj , because S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj ), and as 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and  satisfy
Postulate PS, S |=CPL ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj ), and hence |=M ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕj ). Then, by the construction ofM, there is some w′ ∈ W
such that |=M
w′ ψ , for all ϕ → [a]ψ such that S ,Ea,Ia |= ϕ → [a]ψ and |=Mw ϕ, and wRaw′. Hence, |=Mw ϕi →〈a〉, and thusM is a model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and.
(⇐): Suppose 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and  do not satisfy Postulate PS. Then there must be ϕ ∈ Fml such that
S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ and S |=CPL ϕ. This means that there is a valuation val of S that falsifies ϕ. As val ∈ W
(becauseM contains all possible valuations of S ),M is not a model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and. 
We shall give an algorithm to find a finite characterization of all5 implicit static laws of a given action theory
〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉. The idea is as follows: for each executability law ϕ → 〈a〉 in the theory, construct from Ea , Ia
and  a set of inexecutabilities {ϕ1 → [a]⊥, . . . , ϕn → [a]⊥} that potentially conflict with ϕ → 〈a〉. For each i,
1 i  n, if ϕ ∧ϕi is satisfiable w.r.t. S , mark ¬(ϕ ∧ϕi) as an implicit static law. Incrementally repeat this procedure
(adding all the implicit ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕi) to S ) until no more implicit static law is obtained.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, consider the action theory 〈S1,E tease1 ,X tease1 ,I tease1 〉 with 
as above. For the action tease, we have the executability 〈tease〉. Now, from E tease1 , I tease1 and  we try to build
an inexecutability for tease. We take [tease]walking and compute then all indirect effects of tease w.r.t. S1. From
walking → alive, we get that alive is an indirect effect of tease, giving us [tease]alive. But 〈tease,alive〉 /∈, which
means the frame axiom ¬alive → [tease]¬alive holds. Together with [tease]alive, this gives us the inexecutability
¬alive → [tease]⊥. As S1 ∪ {,¬alive} is satisfiable ( is the antecedent of the executability 〈tease〉), we get¬alive → ⊥, i.e., the implicit static law alive. For this example no other inexecutability for tease can be derived, so
the computation stops.
Before presenting the pseudo-code of the algorithm we need some definitions.
4 The examples are from [34].
5 Actually what the algorithm does is to find an interpolant of all implicit static laws of the theory.
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In our running example, walking ∨ alive and ¬walking ∨ alive are implicates of the set of formulas {walking →
alive,walking}.
Definition 18. Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ a clause. χ is a prime implicate of ϕ if and only if
• χ is an implicate of ϕ, and
• for every implicate χ ′ of ϕ, χ ′ |=CPL χ implies χ |=CPL χ ′.
The set of all prime implicates of a formula ϕ is denoted PI(ϕ).
For example, the set of prime implicates of p1 is just {p1}, and that of p1 ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p3 ∨ p4) is
{p1,p2,p3 ∨ p4}. In our shooting domain, alive is a prime implicate of {walking → alive,walking}. For more on
prime implicates, their properties and how to compute them see [35].
Definition 19. Let ϕ,ψ ∈ Fml. Then NewCons(ψ,ϕ) = PI(ϕ ∧ ψ) \ PI(ϕ).
The function NewCons(ψ,ϕ) computes the new consequences of ϕ w.r.t. ψ : the set of strongest clauses that follow
from ϕ ∧ ψ , but do not follow from ϕ alone (cf. e.g. [36]). It is computed by subtracting the prime implicates of
ϕ from those of ϕ ∧ ψ . For example, NewCons((¬p1 ∨ p2) ∧ (¬p1 ∨ p3 ∨ p4),p1) = {p2,p3 ∨ p4}. And for our
scenario, NewCons(walking,walking → alive) = {alive,walking}.
The algorithm below improves the one in [37] by integrating a solution to the frame problem (via the dependence
relation ). For convenience, we define Ca = Ea ∪ Ia as the set of all formulas expressing the direct consequences
of an action a, whether they are consistent or not.
Algorithm 1 (Finding all implicit static laws induced by a).
input: 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and
output: Simp∗ , the set of all implicit static laws of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉
Simp∗ := ∅
Ca := Ea ∪ Ia
repeat
Simp := ∅
for all ϕ → 〈a〉 ∈X a do
for all Cˆa ⊆ Cˆa such that Cˆa = ∅ do
ϕCˆa :=
∧{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
ψCˆa :=
∧{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa}
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ϕ
Cˆa
,S) do
if S ∪ Simp∗ ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa ,¬χ} |=CPL ⊥ and ∀i ∈ χ,a  i then
Simp := Simp ∪ {¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa ∧ ¬χ)}
Simp∗ := Simp∗ ∪ Simp
until Simp = ∅
This is the key algorithm of the paper. In each step of the algorithm, S ∪Simp∗ is the updated set of static laws (the
original ones fed with the implicit laws caught up to that point). At the end, Simp∗ collects all the implicit static laws.
Theorem 20. Algorithm 1 terminates.
Proof. Let Ca = Ea ∪ Ia . First, the set of candidates to be an implicit static law that might be due to a and that are
examined in the repeat-loop is{¬(ϕ ∧ ϕ ˆa ∧ ¬χ): Cˆa ⊆ Ca, ϕ → 〈a〉 ∈X a and χ ∈ χ ∈ NewCons(ϕ ˆ a ,S)}.C C
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In each step, either the algorithm stops because Simp = ∅, or at least one of the candidates is put into Simp in the
outermost for-loop. (This one terminates, because X a , Ca and NewCons(.) are finite.) Such a candidate is not going
to be put into Simp in future steps of the algorithm, because once added to S ∪ Simp∗ , it will be in the set of laws
S ∪ Simp∗ of all subsequent executions of the outermost for-loop, falsifying its respective if-test for such a candidate.
Hence the repeat-loop is bounded by the number of candidates, and therefore Algorithm 1 terminates. 
While terminating, our algorithm comes with considerable computational costs: first, the number of formulas ϕCˆa
and ψCˆa is exponential in the size of Ca , and second, the computation of NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) might result in exponential
growth. While we might expect Ca to be reasonably small in practice (because Ea and Ia are in general small), the
size of NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) is more difficult to control.
Example 21. For 〈S1,E tease1 ,X tease1 ,I tease1 〉, Algorithm 1 returns Simp∗ = {alive}.
Theorem 22. Let Simp∗ be the output of Algorithm 1 on input 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and. Then 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with
satisfies Postulate PS if and only if Simp∗ = ∅.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 23. Let Simp∗ be the output of Algorithm 1 on input 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and. Then
(1) 〈S ∪ Simp∗ ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with satisfies PS (has no implicit static law).
(2) S ,Ea,X a,Ia |=∧Simp∗ .
Proof. Item (1) is straightforward from the termination of Algorithm 1 and Theorem 22. Item (2) follows from the
fact that by the if-test in Algorithm 1, the only formulas that are put in Simp∗ at each execution of the repeat-loop are
exactly those that are implicit static laws of the current theory, and therefore of the original theory, too. 
Corollary 24. For all ϕ ∈ Fml, S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ if and only if S ∪ Simp∗ |=CPL ϕ.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, let S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ, for given ϕ ∈ Fml. Then S ∪Simp∗ ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ,
by monotonicity. By Theorem 23(1), 〈S ∪ Simp∗ ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 has no implicit static law, hence S ∪ Simp∗ |=CPL ϕ.
The right-to-left direction is straightforward by Theorem 23(2). 
What shall we do once we have discovered an implicit static law?
The existence of implicit static laws may indicate too strong executability laws: in Example 21, we wrongly as-
sumed that tease is always executable. Thus one way of ‘repairing’ our theory would be to consider the weaker
executability alive → 〈tease〉 instead of 〈tease〉 in X tease.
On the other hand, implicit static laws may also indicate that the inexecutability laws are too strong:
Example 25. Consider S = ∅, E shoot = {loaded → [shoot]¬alive}, X shoot = {hasGun → 〈shoot〉} and Ishoot =
{[shoot]⊥}, with the dependence relation = {〈shoot,¬alive〉, 〈shoot,¬walking〉. For this theory Algorithm 1 re-
turns Simp∗ = {¬hasGun}.
In Example 25 we discovered that the agent never has a gun. The problem here can be overcome by weakening
[shoot]⊥ in Ishoot with ¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥.6
6 Regarding Examples 21 and 25, one might argue that in practice such silly errors will never be made. Nevertheless, the examples here given are
quite simplistic, and for applications of real interest, whose complexity will be much higher, we simply cannot rely on the designer’s knowledge
about all side effects the stated formulas can have.
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laws, or even to too strong frame axioms (i.e., a too weak dependence relation). To witness, for Example 21, if
we replace the law [tease]walking by the weaker alive → [tease]walking, the resulting action theory would satisfy
Postulate PS. In the same way, stating the (unintuitive) dependence tease alive (which means the frame axiom
¬alive → [tease]¬alive is no longer valid) guarantees satisfaction of PS. (Note, however, that this solution becomes
intuitive when alive is replaced by awake.)
To finish, implicit static laws of course may also indicate that the static laws are too weak:
Example 26. Suppose a computer representation of the line of integers, in which we can be at a strictly positive
number, pos, or at a negative one or zero, ¬pos. Let maxInt and minInt, respectively, be the largest and the smallest
representable integer number. Action goLeft is the action of moving to the biggest integer strictly smaller than the one
at which we are. Consider the following action theory for this scenario (ati means we are at number i):
S = {ati → pos: 0 < i maxInt} ∪ {ati → ¬pos: minInt i  0},
E = {atminInt → [goLeft]underflow}∪ {ati → [goLeft]ati−1: i > minInt},
X = {〈goLeft〉}, I = ∅
with the dependence relation (minInt i maxInt):
=
{ 〈goLeft,ati〉, 〈goLeft,pos〉,
〈goLeft,¬pos〉, 〈goLeft,underflow〉
}
.
Applying Algorithm 1 to this action theory gives us the implicit static law ¬(at1 ∧ at2), i.e., we cannot be at numbers
1 and 2 at the same time.
To summarize, in order to satisfy Postulate PS, an action theory should contain a complete set of static laws or,
alternatively, should not contain too strong action laws.
Remark 27. S ∪ Simp∗ in general is not intuitive.
Whereas in the latter example the implicit static laws should be added to S , in the others the implicit static laws
are unintuitive and due to an (in)executability law that is too strong and should be weakened. Of course, how intuitive
the modified action theory will be depends mainly on the knowledge engineer’s choice.
To sum it up, eliminating implicit static laws may require revision of S , Ea or , or completion of X a and Ia .
Completing Ia is the topic we address in the next section.
5. No implicit inexecutability laws
Let S2 = S1, E2 = E1 and X2 = I2 = ∅, and let  be that for 〈S1,E1,X1,I1〉. Note that 〈S2,E2,X2,I2〉 and 
satisfy Postulate PS. From [tease]walking it follows with S2 that [tease]alive, i.e., in every situation, after teasing the
turkey, it is alive: S2,E tease2 |=PDL [tease]alive. Now as tease  alive, the status of alive is not modified by tease, and
we have S2,E tease2 |= ¬alive → [tease]¬alive. From the above, it follows
S2,E tease2 ,X tease2 ,I tease2 |= ¬alive → [tease]⊥,
i.e., an inexecutability law stating that a dead turkey cannot be teased. But
S2,I tease2 |=PDL ¬alive → [tease]⊥,
hence Postulate PI is violated. Here the formula ¬alive → [tease]⊥ is an example of what we call an implicit inexe-
cutability law.
In the literature, such laws are also known as implicit qualifications [25], and it has been often supposed, in a more
or less tacit way, that it is a positive feature of frameworks to leave them implicit and provide mechanisms for inferring
them [2,38,39]. The other way round, one might argue as well that implicit qualifications indicate that the domain has
not been described in an adequate manner: the form of inexecutability laws is simpler than that of effect laws, and
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action should be explicitly stated, and this is what Postulate PI says.
How can we check whether PI is violated? We can conceive an algorithm to find implicit inexecutability laws of
a given action a. The basic idea is as follows: for every combination of effect laws of the form (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) →
[a](ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn), with each ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea , if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn is consistent w.r.t. to S , ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψn inconsistent
w.r.t. S , and S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) → [a]⊥, then output (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn) → [a]⊥ as an implicit inexecutability
law. Our algorithm basically does this, and moreover takes into account dependence information.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, take 〈S2,E tease2 ,X tease2 ,I tease2 〉 with as given above. From E tease2
we get the law  → [tease]walking, whose antecedent is consistent with S . As long as |= ¬alive → [tease]¬alive
and S ∪ {walking} |=CPL alive, and because S ,I tease2 |=PDL ( ∧ ¬alive) → [tease]⊥, we caught an implicit inexe-
cutability. As there is no other combination of effect laws for tease, we end the simulation here.
Below is the pseudo-code of the algorithm for that (the reason X a is not used in the computation will be made
clear in the sequel):
Algorithm 2 (Finding implicit inexecutability laws for a).
input: 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and
output: Iaimp , the set of implicit inexecutability laws for a
Iaimp := ∅
for all Eˆa ⊆ Ea do
ϕEˆa :=
∧{ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
ψEˆa :=
∧{ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa}
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) do
if ∀i ∈ χ,a  i and S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ) → [a]⊥ then
Iaimp := Iaimp ∪ {(ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ) → [a]⊥}
Theorem 28. Algorithm 2 terminates.
Proof. Straightforward, as we have assumed S , E , I and finite, and NewCons(.) is finite (because S and ψEˆa are
finite). 
Example 29. Consider S2,E tease2 ,X tease2 ,I tease2 and  as given above. Then Algorithm 2 returns I teaseimp = {¬alive →[tease]⊥}.
Nevertheless, applying Algorithm 2 is not enough to guarantee Postulate PI, as illustrated by the following exam-
ple:
Example 30 (Incompleteness of Algorithm 2 without PS). Let S = ∅, Ea = {p1 → [a]p2}, X a = {〈a〉}, Ia = {p2 →
[a]⊥}, and= ∅. Then we have S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= p1 → [a]⊥, but running Algorithm 2 on 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 we get
S ,Iaimp |=PDL p1 → [a]⊥.
Example 30 shows that the presence of implicit static laws (induced by executabilities) implies the existence of
implicit inexecutabilities that are not caught by Algorithm 2. One way of getting rid of this is requiring 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉
and to satisfy Postulate PS prior to running Algorithm 2. This gives us the following result:
Theorem 31. Let Iaimp be the output of Algorithm 2 on input 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and . If 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with 
satisfies Postulate PS, then it satisfies Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
7 Note that this concerns the necessary conditions for executability, and thus it is not related to the qualification problem, which basically says
that it is difficult to state all the sufficient conditions for executability.
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With Algorithm 2, not only do we decide whether Postulate PI is satisfied, but we also get information on how to
“repair” the action theory. The set of implicit inexecutabilities so obtained provides logical and metalogical informa-
tion concerning the correction that must be carried out: in the first case, elements of Iaimp can be added to Ia ; in the
second one, Iaimp helps in properly changing Ea or . For instance, to correct the action theory of our example, the
knowledge engineer would have the following options:
(1) Add the qualification ¬alive → [tease]⊥ to I tease2 ; or
(2) Add the (unintuitive) dependence 〈tease,alive〉 to; or
(3) Weaken the effect law [tease]walking to alive → [tease]walking in E tease2 .
It is easy to see that whatever she opts for, the resulting action theory for tease will satisfy Postulate PI (while still
satisfying PS).
Example 32 (Drinking coffee [12]). Suppose a situation in which we reason about the effects of drinking a cup of
coffee:
S = ∅, Edrink =
{
sugar → [drink]happy,
salt → [drink]¬happy
}
, X drink = Idrink = ∅
and the dependence relation
= {〈drink,happy〉, 〈drink,¬happy〉}.
Observe that 〈S ,Edrink,X drink,Idrink〉 with satisfies PS. Then, running Algorithm 2 on this action theory will give
us Idrinkimp = {(sugar ∧ salt) → [drink]⊥}.
Remark 33. Ia ∪ Iaimp is not always intuitive.
Whereas in Example 29 we have got an inexecutability that could be safely added to I tease2 , in Example 32 we got
an inexecutability that is unintuitive (just the presence of sugar and salt in the coffee precludes drinking it). In that
case, revision of other parts of the theory should be considered in order to make it intuitive. Anyway, the problem
pointed out in the depicted scenario just illustrates that intuition is beyond syntax. The scope of this work relies on the
syntactical level. Only the knowledge engineer can judge about how intuitive a formula is.
In what follows we revisit our postulates in order to strengthen them to the case where more than one action is
under concern and thus get results that can be applied to whole action theories.
6. Generalizing the postulates
We have seen the importance that satisfaction of Postulates PC, PS and PI may have in describing the action theory
of a particular action a. However, in applications of real interest more than one action is involved, and thus a natural
question that could be raised is “can we have similar metatheoretical results for multiple action theories”?
In this section we generalize our set of postulates to action theories as a whole, i.e., considering all actions of a
domain, and prove some interesting results that follow from that. As we are going to see, some of these results are
straightforward, while others must rely on some additional assumptions in order to hold.
A generalization of Postulate PC is quite easy and has no need for justification:
PC∗ (Logical consistency): S ,E ,X ,I |= ⊥.
The whole action theory should be logically consistent.
Generalizing Postulate PS will give us the following:
PS∗ (No implicit static laws):
if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ, then S |=CPL ϕ.
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laws alone. We have the following results:
Theorem 34. 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy PS∗ if and only if 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and satisfies PS for all a ∈ Act.
Proof. (⇒): Straightforward: Suppose that for some a ∈ Act 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 does not satisfy PS. Then there is ϕ ∈
Fml such that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ and S |=CPL ϕ. Of course S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ, by monotonicity, but still S |=CPL ϕ.
Hence 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 does not satisfy PS∗.
(⇐): Suppose 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  does not satisfy PS∗. Then there is ϕ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ and
S |=CPL ϕ. ϕ is equivalent to ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn, with ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ Fml and such that there is at least one ϕi such that
S |=CPL ϕi (otherwise S |=CPL ϕ). Because the logic is independently axiomatized, there must be some a ∈ Act such
that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕi . From this and S |=CPL ϕi it follows that 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and with do not satisfy PS. 
Corollary 35. 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗ if and only if the big model for 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  is a
model of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉.
Proof. The proof follows from Theorems 16 and 34. 
Theorem 36. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfies PS∗, then 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfies PC∗ if and only if
〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and satisfy PC for all a ∈ Act.
Proof. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy PS∗.
(⇒): Suppose that 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with  does not satisfy PC, for some a ∈ Act. Because 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and 
satisfy PS∗, 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and satisfy Postulate PS (Theorem 34), and then S |=CPL ⊥. From this it follows that
〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 does not satisfy Postulate PC∗.
(⇐): Suppose 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  do not satisfy PC∗. Then S ,E ,X ,I |= ⊥. Because 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with 
satisfies Postulate PS∗, S |=CPL ⊥. Since Act = ∅, there is some a ∈ Act such that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ⊥. 
A more general form of Postulate PI can also be stated:
PI∗ (No implicit inexecutability laws):
if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥, then S ,I |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥.
If an inexecutability law can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it should be inferable in PDL from the
static and inexecutability laws alone.
Note that having that 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with  satisfies PI for all a ∈ Act is not enough to 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with 
satisfy PI∗ if there are implicit static laws. To witness, let S = Ea1 = ∅, and X a1 = {〈a1〉}, Ia1 = {ϕ → [a1]⊥}.
Let also Ea2 = X a2 = Ia2 = ∅. Observe that both 〈S ,Ea1 ,X a1,Ia1〉 and 〈S ,Ea2 ,X a2,Ia2〉 with  satisfy PI, but
S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a2]⊥ and S ,I |=PDL ϕ → [a2]⊥.
Nevertheless, under PS∗ the result follows:
Theorem 37. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfy PS∗. 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfies PI∗ if and only if 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉
and satisfy PI for all a ∈ Act.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
In the next section we make a step toward an attempt of amending our modularity criteria by investigating possible
extensions of our set of postulates.
7. Can we ask for more?
Can we augment our set of postulates to take into account other modules of action theories, or even other metathe-
oretical issues in reasoning about actions? That is the topic we discuss in what follows.
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It seems to be in line with our postulates to require action theories not to allow for the deduction of new effect laws:
if an effect law can be inferred from an action theory (and no inexecutability for the same action in the same context
can be derived), then it should be inferable from the set of static and effect laws alone. This means we should have:
PE (No implicit effect laws):
if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥,
then S ,E |= ϕ → [a]ψ.
But consider the following intuitively correct action theory:
S3 = ∅, E3 =
{
loaded → [shoot]¬alive,
(¬loaded ∧ alive) → [shoot]alive
}
,
X3 =
{
hasGun → 〈shoot〉}, I3 = {¬hasGun → [shoot]⊥}
together with the dependence shoot¬alive. It satisfies Postulates PS∗ and PI∗, but does not satisfy PE. Indeed:
S3,E3,X3,I3 |= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded → [shoot]¬alive
and
S3,E3,X3,I3 |= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded → [shoot]⊥,
but
S3,E3 |= ¬hasGun ∨ loaded → [shoot]¬alive.
So, Postulate PE would not help us to deliver the goods.
Another possibility of improving our modularity criteria could be:
P⊥ (No unattainable effects):
if ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ E , then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥.
This expresses that if we have explicitly stated an effect law for a in some context, then there should be no in-
executability law for the same action in the same context. It is straightforward to design an algorithm which checks
whether this postulate is satisfied. We do not investigate this further here, but just observe that the slightly stronger
version below leads to unintuitive consequences:
P⊥’ (No unattainable effects—strong version):
if S ,E |= ϕ → [a]ψ, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥.
Indeed, for the above action theory we have
E3 |= (¬hasGun ∧ loaded) → [shoot]¬alive,
but
S3,E3,X3,I3 |= (¬hasGun ∧ loaded) → [shoot]⊥.
This is certainly too strong. Our example also illustrates that it is sometimes natural to have ‘redundancies’ or ‘over-
laps’ between E and I . Indeed, as we have pointed out, inexecutability laws are a particular kind of effect laws, and
the distinction here made is conventional. The decision of considering them as strictly different entities or not depends
mainly on the context. At a representational level we prefer to keep them separated, while in Algorithm 1 we have
mixed them together in order to compute the consequences of an action.
In what follows we address the problem of completing the set of executability laws of an action theory.
968 A. Herzig, I. Varzinczak / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 951–9847.2. Maximizing executability
As we have seen, implicit static laws only show up when there are executability laws. So, a question that naturally
raises is “which executability laws can be consistently added to a given action theory?”.
A hypothesis usually made in the literature is that of maximization of executabilities: in the absence of a proof that
an action is inexecutable in a given context, assume its executability for that context. Such a hypothesis is captured by
the following postulate that we investigate in this section:
PX+ (Maximal executability laws):
if S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥, then S ,X a |=PDL ϕ → 〈a〉.
Such a postulate expresses that if in context ϕ no inexecutability for a can be inferred, then the respective exe-
cutability should follow in PDL from the executability and static laws.
Postulate PX+ generally holds in non-monotonic frameworks, and can be enforced in monotonic approaches such
as ours by maximizing X a . We nevertheless would like to point out that maximizing executability is not always
intuitive. To witness, suppose we know that if we have the ignition key, the tank is full, . . . , and the battery tension
is beyond 10 V, then the car (necessarily) will start. Suppose we also know that if the tension is below 8 V, then
the car will not start. What should we conclude in situations where we know that the tension is 9 V? Maximizing
executabilities makes us infer that it will start, but such reasoning is not what we want if we would like to be sure that
all possible executions lead to the goal.
8. Exploiting modularity
In this section we present other properties related to consistency and modularity of action theories, emphasizing
the main results that we obtain when Postulate PS∗ is satisfied.
Theorem 38. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with satisfies PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ⊥ if and only if S |=CPL ⊥.
This theorem says that if there are no implicit static laws, then consistency of an action theory can be checked by
just checking consistency of S .
Theorem 39. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ if and only if
S ,Ea,Ia |= ϕ → [a]ψ .
Proof. See Appendix D. 
This means that under PS∗ we have modularity inside E , too: when deducing the effects of a we need not consider
the action laws for other actions. Versions for executability and inexecutability can be stated as well:
Theorem 40. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉 if and only if S ,X a |=
ϕ → 〈a〉.
Proof. See Appendix E. 
Corollary 41. PX is a consequence of PS.
Proof. Straightforward. 
Theorem 42. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulates PS∗ and PI∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥ if and only if
S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥.
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this and PI∗ we get S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥.
(⇐): Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there is a -model M such that |=M S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and |=M
ϕ → [a]⊥. Then, given a, we have |=M S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia , and then |=M S ∧ Ia . Moreover, by definition,M is a
PDL-model. Hence S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥. 
In Theorems 40 and 42, modularity guarantees moreover that no dependence is needed to derive, respectively,
executabilities and inexecutabilities.
Let Ea1,...,an =⋃1in Eai , X a1,...,an =⋃1inX ai , and Ia1,...,an =⋃1in Iai . Under Postulate PS∗, deduc-
tion of an effect of a sequence of actions a1; . . . ;an (prediction) needs neither the effect and inexecutability laws for
actions other than a1, . . . , an, nor the executability laws of the domain:
Theorem 43. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ if and only if
S ,Ea1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ .
Proof. See Appendix F. 
The same result holds for testing inexecutability of a sequence of actions:
Corollary 44. If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]⊥ if and only if
S ,Ea1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]⊥.
Proof. Straightforward, as a special case of Theorem 43. 
The next theorem shows that our notion of modularity is also fruitful in plan validation:
Theorem 45. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy Postulate PS∗. Then we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ if and
only if S ,Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ .
Proof. See Appendix G.
And as a consequence, we also optimize testing executability of a plan:
Corollary 46. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗. Then we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉 if
and only if S ,Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉.
Proof. Straightforward, as a special case of Theorem 45.
Theorems 43 and 45 together with Corollaries 44 and 46 suggest that we can simulate modularization by sub-
domains [40]: If 〈{a1, . . . , an},Prop′〉 is a sub-domain for some Prop′ ⊆ Prop, then 〈S ,Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an〉
with corresponds to the module for 〈{a1, . . . , an},Prop′〉 in Lifschitz and Ren’s sense (see the next section).
9. Related work
Pirri and Reiter have investigated the metatheory of the Situation Calculus [41]. In a spirit similar to ours, they use
executability laws and effect laws. Contrarily to us, their executability laws are equivalences and are thus at the same
time inexecutability laws. As they restrict themselves to domains without ramifications, there are no static laws, i.e.,
S = ∅. For this setting they give a syntactical condition on effect laws guaranteeing that they do not interact with the
executability laws in the sense that they do not entail implicit static laws. Basically, the condition says that when there
are effect laws ϕ1 → [a]ψ and ϕ2 → [a]¬ψ , then ϕ1 and ϕ2 are inconsistent (which essentially amounts to having in
their theories a kind of “implicit static law schema” of the form ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)).
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problem for this calculus, and show for several problems such as consistency or regression that only some of the
modules of an action theory are necessary.
Amir [42] focuses on design and maintainability of action descriptions applying many of the concepts of the object-
oriented paradigm in the Situation Calculus. In that work, guidelines for a partitioned representation of a given theory
are presented, with which the inference task can also be optimized, as it is restricted to the part of the theory that is
really relevant to a given query. This is observed specially when different agents are involved: the design of an agent’s
theory can be done with no regard to others’, and after the integration of multiple agents, queries about an agent’s
beliefs do not take into account the belief state of other agents.
In the referred work, executabilities are as in [41] and the same condition on effect laws is assumed, which syn-
tactically precludes the existence of implicit static laws. The frame problem is solved using Reiter’s solution [32] and
then is also restricted to domains without static laws. Ramifications are dealt with by compiling them away à la Reiter
and Lin [43] based on the method given in [44], which takes into account only some restricted state constraints.
In spite of using many of the object-oriented paradigm tools and techniques, no mention is made to the concepts of
cohesion and coupling [45,46], which are closely related to modularity [12]. In the approach presented in [42], even
if modules are highly cohesive, they are not necessarily lowly coupled, due to the dependence between objects in the
reasoning phase. We do not investigate this further here, but conjecture that this could be done there by, during the
reasoning process defined for that approach, avoiding passing to a module a formula of a type different from those it
contains.
The present work generalizes and extends Pirri and Reiter’s result to the case where S = ∅ and both these works
where the syntactical restriction on effect laws is not made. This gives us more expressive power, as we can reason
about inexecutabilities, and a better modularity in the sense that we do not combine formulas that are conceptually
different (viz. executabilities and inexecutabilities). It also constitutes a better approach for domains with ramifications
as we do not impose any restriction on the domain laws we can deal with.
Zhang et al. [47] have also proposed an assessment of what a good action theory should look like. They develop
the ideas in the framework of EPDL [6], an extended version of PDL which allows for propositions as modalities
to represent a causal connection between literals. We do not present the details of that, but concentrate on the main
meta-theoretical results.
Zhang et al. propose a normal form for describing action theories,8 and investigate three levels of consistency.
Roughly speaking, a set of laws T is uniformly consistent if it is globally consistent (i.e., T |=EPDL⊥); a formula Φ is
T -consistent if T |=EPDL¬Φ , for T a uniformly consistent theory; T is universally consistent if (in our terms) every
logically possible world is accessible.
Furthermore, two assumptions are made to preclude the existence of implicit qualifications. Satisfaction of such
assumptions means the theory under consideration is safe, i.e., it is uniformly consistent. Such a normal form justifies
the two assumptions made and on which their notion of good theories relies.
Given this, they propose algorithms to test the different versions of consistency for a theory T that is in normal
form. This test essentially amounts to checking whether T is safe, i.e., whether T |=EPDL〈a〉, for every action a.
Success of this check should mean that the theory under analysis satisfies the consistency requirements.
Although they are concerned with the same kind of problems that have been discussed in this work, they take an
overall view of the subject, in the sense that all problems are dealt with together. This means that in their approach no
special attention (in our sense) is given to the different components of the theory, and then every time something is
wrong with it this is taken as a global problem inherent to the theory as a whole. Whereas such a “systemic” view of
action theories is not necessarily a drawback (we have just seen the strong interaction that exists between the different
sets of laws composing an action theory), being modular in our sense allows us to better identify the “problematic”
laws and take care of them. Moreover, the advantage of allowing to find the set of laws which must be modified in
order to achieve the desired consistency is made evident by the algorithms we have proposed (while their results only
allow to decide whether a given theory satisfies some consistency requirement).
8 But not as expressive as one might think: For instance, in modeling the nondeterministic action of dropping a coin on a chessboard, we are
not able to state [drop](black ∨ white). Instead, we should write something like [dropblack]black, [dropwhite]white, [dropblack,white]black and
[dropblack,white]white, where dropblack is the action of dropping the coin on a black square (analogously for the others) and drop = dropblack ∪
dropwhite ∪ dropblack,white, with “∪” the nondeterministic composition of actions.
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computational aspects.
To solve the frame problem, they suppose an abstract notion of completion. Given a theory T a containing logical
information about a’s direct effects as well as the indirect effects that may follow (expressed in the form of causal
laws), the completion of T a , roughly speaking, is the original theory T a amended of some axioms stating the per-
sistence of all non-affected (directly nor indirectly) literals. (Note that such a notion of completion is close to the
underlying semantics of the dependence relation used throughout the present work, which essentially amounts to the
explanation closure assumption [26].)
Their EXECUTABILITY problem is to check whether action a is executable in all possible initial states (Zhang et
al.’s safety property). This amounts to testing whether every possible state w has a successor w′ reachable by a such
that w and w′ both satisfy the completion of T a . For the Walking Turkey Scenario, the formalization of action tease
with causal laws is given by:
T tease =
{ tease⇒ walking,
¬alive ⇒ ¬walking
}
where the first formula is a conditional effect law for tease, and the latter a causal law in McCain and Turner’s sense.
We will not dive in the technical details, and just note that the executability check will return “no” for this example as
tease cannot be executed in a state satisfying ¬alive.
In the mentioned work, the authors are more concerned with the complexity analysis of the problem of doing such
a consistency test and no algorithm for performing it is given, however. Despite the fact their motivation is the same
as ours, again what is presented is a kind of “yes-no tool” which can help in doing a meta-theoretical analysis of a
given action theory, and many of the comments concerning Zhang et al.’s approach could be repeated here.
Another criticism that could be made about both these approaches concerns the assumption of full executability
they rely on. We find it too strong to require all actions to be always executable (cf. Section 7), and to reject as bad an
action theory admitting situations where some action cannot be executed at all. As an example, consider a very simple
action theory 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉, where S = {walking → alive}, E = {[tease]walking}, X = {〈tease〉}, and I = ∅, with a
dependence relation given by= {〈tease,walking〉}. Observe that, with our approach, it suffices to derive the implicit
inexecutability law ¬alive → [tease]⊥, change I , and the system will properly run in situations where ¬alive is the
case.
On the other hand, if we consider the equivalent representation of such an action theory in the approach of Lang et
al., after computing the completion of T tease, if we test its executability, we will get the answer “no”, the reason being
that tease is not executable in the possible state where ¬alive holds. Such an answer is correct, but note that with only
this as guideline we have no idea about where a possible modification in the action theory should be carried out in
order to achieve full executability for tease. The same observation holds for Zhang et al.’s proposal.
Just to see how things can be even worse, let the same action theory as above, but with X = {alive → 〈tease〉},
obtained by its correction with the algorithms we proposed. Observe that the resulting theory satisfies all our postu-
lates. It is not hard to see, however, that the representation of such an action theory in the above frameworks, when
checked by their respective consistency tests, is still considered to have a problem.
This problem arises because Lang et al.’s proposal do not allow for executability laws, thus one cannot make
the distinction between X = {〈tease〉}, X = {alive → 〈tease〉} and X = ∅. By their turn, Zhang et al. allows
for specifying executabilities, however their consistency definitions do not distinguish the cases alive → 〈tease〉
and 〈tease〉.
A concept similar to that of implicit static laws was firstly addressed, as far as we are concerned, in the realm of
regulation consistency with deontic logic [49]. Indeed, the notions of regulation consistency given in the mentioned
work and that of modularity presented in [37] and refined here can be proved to be equivalent. The main difference
between the mentioned work and the approach in [37] relies on the fact that in [49] some syntactical restrictions on
the formulas have to be made in order to make the algorithm to work.
Lifschitz and Ren [40] propose an action description language derived from C+ [50] in which domain descriptions
can also be decomposed in modules. Contrarily to our setting, in theirs a module is not a set of formulas for given
action a, but rather a description of a subsystem of the theory, i.e., each module describes a set of interrelated fluents
and actions. As an example, a module describing Lin’s suitcase [2] should contain all causal laws in the sense of
C+ that are relevant to the scenario. Actions or fluents having nothing to do, neither directly nor indirectly, with
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dependent, while here we have proposed a type-oriented modularization of the formulas, which does not depend on
the domain.
In the referred work, modules can be defined in order to specialize other modules. This is done by making the new
module to inherit and then specialize other modules’ components. This is an important feature when elaborations are
involved. In the suitcase example, adding a new action relevant to the suitcase description can be achieved by defining
a new module inheriting all properties of the old one and containing the causal laws needed for the new action. Such
ideas are interesting from the standpoint of software and knowledge engineer: reusability is an intrinsic property of
the framework, and easy scalability promotes elaboration tolerance.
Consistency of a given theory and how to prevent conflicts between modules (independent or inherited) however is
not addressed.
In this work we have illustrated by some examples what we can do in order to make a theory intuitive. This involves
theory modification. Action theory change has been addressed in the recent literature on revision and update [51–53].
In [54] we have investigated this issue and shown the importance that modularity has in such a task.
10. Conclusion
Our contribution is twofold: general, as we presented postulates that apply to all reasoning about actions for-
malisms; and specific, as we proposed algorithms for a dependence-based solution to the frame problem.
We have defined here the concept of modularity of an action theory and pointed out some of the problems that
arise if it is not satisfied. In particular we have argued that the non-dynamic part of action theories could influence but
should not be influenced by the dynamic one.9
We have put forward some postulates, and in particular tried to demonstrate that when there are implicit static
and inexecutability laws then one has slipped up in designing the action theory in question. As shown, a possible
solution comes into its own with Algorithms 1 and 2, which can give us some guidelines in correcting an action
theory if needed. By means of examples we have seen that there are several alternatives of correction, and choosing
the right module to be modified as well as providing the intuitive information that must be supplied is up to the
knowledge engineer.
Given the difficulty of exhaustively enumerating all the preconditions under which a given action is executable
(and also those under which such an action cannot be executed), it is reasonable to expect that there is always going to
be some executability precondition ϕ1 and some inexecutability precondition ϕ2 that together lead to a contradiction,
forcing, thus, an implicit static law ¬(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2). This is the reason we propose to state some information about both
executabilities and inexecutabilities, and then run the algorithms in order to improve the description.
It could be argued that unintuitive consequences in action theories are mainly due to badly written axioms and not
to the lack of modularity. True enough, but what we have presented here is the case that making a domain description
modular gives us a tool to detect at least some of such problems and correct it. (But note that we do not claim to
correct badly written axioms automatically and once for all.) Besides this, having separate entities in the ontology
and controlling their interaction help us to localize where the problems are, which can be crucial for real world
applications.
In this work we have illustrated by some examples what we can do in order to make a theory intuitive. This involves
theory modification. In [31] we have presented a general method for changing a domain description given a formula
we want to contract. Their we have defined a semantics for theory contraction and also presented its syntactical coun-
terpart through contraction operators. Soundness and completeness of such operators with respect to the semantics
have been established. In that work we have also shown that modularity is a sufficient condition for contraction to be
successful. This gives further evidence that the notion of modularity is fruitful.
Our postulates can be formulated in any reasoning about actions framework, but the algorithms require a decidable
logic (in particular Algorithm 2). PDL is one candidate for that, as we have seen along the paper. For first-order-based
frameworks the consistency checks of Algorithms 1 and 2 are undecidable. We can get rid of this by assuming that
there is no function symbol in the language. In this way, the result of NewCons(.) is finite and the algorithm terminates.
9 It might be objected that it is only by doing experiments that one learns the static laws that govern the universe. But note that this involves
learning, whereas here—as always done in the reasoning about actions field—the static laws are known once forever, and do not evolve.
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fluents.
The present paper is also a step toward a solution to the problem of indirect dependences: indeed, if the implicit
dependence shoot¬walking is not in, then after running Algorithm 2 we get an indirect inexecutability (loaded∧
walking) → [shoot]⊥, i.e., shoot cannot be executed if loaded ∧ walking holds. Such an unintuitive inexecutability is
not in I and thus indicates the missing indirect dependence.
The general case is nevertheless more complex, and it seems that such indirect dependences cannot be computed
automatically in the case of indeterminate effects (cf. the example in [23]). We are currently investigating this issue.
The first work on formalizing modularity in logical systems in general is due to Garson [55]. Modularity of the-
ories in reasoning about actions was originally defined in [15]. Modularization of ontologies in description logics is
addressed in [56]. A different viewpoint of the work we presented here can be found in [12], where modularity of
action theories is assessed from a software engineering perspective. A modularity-based approach for narrative rea-
soning about actions is given in [57]. In [13] we show that our modularity notion can also be extended to ontologies
in the description logic ALC.
Our postulates do not take into account causality statements linking propositions such as those defined in
[2,3,39,58]. This could be a topic for further investigation.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Ivan Varzinczak has been supported by a fellowship from the government of the FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF
BRAZIL. Grant: CAPES BEX 1389/01-7.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 22
Let Simp∗ be the output of Algorithm 1 on input 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and . Then 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with  satisfies
Postulate PS if and only if Simp∗ = ∅.
We recall that |=CPL is logical consequence in classical propositional logic, and PI(A) is the set of prime implicates
of a set A of classical formulas.
Before giving the proof of the theorems, we recall some properties of prime implicates [35,59] and of the function
NewCons(.) [36] (see Section 4). Let ϕ ∈ Fml, A ⊆ Fml finite (identified with the conjunction of its formulas), and χ
be a clause. Then
(1) |=CPL ϕ ↔∧PI(ϕ) [35, Corollary 3.2].
(2) PI(A) ∪ NewCons(ϕ,A) = PI(A ∧ ϕ) (by definition of NewCons(,)).
(3) |=CPL (A ∧ ϕ) ↔ (A ∧ NewCons(ϕ,A)) (from (1) and (2))
(4) If PI(ϕ) |=CPL χ , then there is χ ′ ∈ PI(ϕ) such that χ ′ |=CPL χ [35, Proposition 3.4].
Let 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with  be an action theory for a, and let ϕ → 〈a〉 ∈ X a , Ca = Ea ∪ Ia , and Cˆa ⊆ Ca . We
define:
ϕCˆa =
∧{
ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa
}
,
ψCˆa =
∧{
ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Cˆa
}
.
Moreover, let indepa = {¬: a  }.
Lemma 47. Let indep′a ⊆ indepa . S ∪ {ψCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ if and only if S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S )∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof.
S ∪ {ψ ˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥C
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PI
(S ∪ {ψCˆa }
)∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (by property (1))
if and only if
PI
(S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S )
)∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (by property (2))
if and only if
S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (by property (1)). 
Lemma 48. Let indep′a ⊆ indepa . If S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then there exists χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S )
such that S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof.
S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥
if and only if
PI(S ) ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (by property (1))
if and only if
PI
(S ∪ {ψCˆa }
)∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (by property (2))
if and only if
PI
(S ∪ {ψCˆa }
) |=CPL ¬∧{¬i : ¬i ∈ indep′a}
if and only if
PI
(S ∪ {ψCˆa }
) |=CPL ∨{i : ¬i ∈ indep′a}
if and only if there exists χ ∈ PI(S ∪ {ψCˆa }) such that
χ |=CPL
∨
{i : ¬i ∈ indep′a} (by property (4))
if and only if
{χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥
if and only if
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥. 
Lemma 49. Let indep′a ⊆ indepa . If we have S ∪{ϕ,ϕCˆa }∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪NewCons(ψCˆa ,S )∪ indep′a |=CPL
⊥, then there exists χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) such that S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof. By Lemma 48 and classical logic. 
Lemma 50. Let indep′a ⊆ indepa . If we have S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪
indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then there exists χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) such that both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
Proof. Trivially, by Lemma 49. 
A. Herzig, I. Varzinczak / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 951–984 975Lemma 51. Let indep′a ⊆ indepa . If χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) is such that S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪
indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a 
i} |=CPL ⊥.
Proof. Let S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) be such that S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
If χ = ⊥, the result is trivial. Otherwise, we have the following cases:
• If atm(χ) ⊂ atm(indep′a), then the premise is false (and the lemma trivially holds).
• If atm(χ) = atm(indep′a), the lemma holds.
• Let atm(χ) ⊂ atm(indep′a). Then, from
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (the hypothesis)
it follows
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥.
From
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ (hypothesis)
and because
S ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥,
it follows
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥. 
Lemma 52. If χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) is such that both S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪
{χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥, then S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa ,¬χ} |=CPL ⊥ and for all i ∈ χ , a  i .
Proof. From
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥
we conclude
S ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥.
From this and the hypothesis
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥,
it follows
S ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ¬χ.
If S |=CPL ¬χ , then S ∪ {ψCˆa } |=CPL ¬χ , and because χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ), we have χ |=CPL ¬χ , a contradic-
tion. Hence S ∪ {χ} |=CPL ⊥.
Suppose now there is a literal  ∈ χ such that ¬ /∈ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i}. Then, the propositional valuation in
which χ←true satisfies
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i},
and then
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥.
Hence there cannot be such a literal, and then for all i ∈ χ , a  i .
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S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥
it follows S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa ,¬χ} |=CPL ⊥. 
Proof of Theorem 22. We are about to prove that 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with  satisfies Postulate PS if and only if
Simp∗ = ∅.
(⇒): Suppose Simp∗ = ∅. Then at the first step of the algorithm there has been some ϕ → 〈a〉 ∈ X a and some
Cˆa ⊆ Ca such that for some χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ), S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa ∧ ¬χ) and S |=CPL ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕCˆa ∧
¬χ). Hence 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 does not satisfy Postulate PS.
(⇐): Suppose that Simp∗ = ∅. Therefore for all ϕ′ → 〈a〉 ∈X a and for all subsets Cˆa ⊆ Ca , we have that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ), if
S ∪ {ϕ′, ϕCˆa ,¬χ} |=CPL ⊥, (A.1)
then there exists i ∈ χ such that a i .
From (A.1) and Lemma 52, we get
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ), if
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕCˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥,
then S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥.
From this and Lemma 51, it follows that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ), if S ∪ {ϕ′, ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥,
then S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
This and Lemma 50 give us
if S ∪ {ϕ′, ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then
S ∪ NewCons(ψCˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥
From this and Lemma 47, it follows that for all indep′a ⊆ indepa , for every ϕ′ → 〈a〉 ∈X a and all Cˆa ⊆ Ca ,
if S ∪ {ϕ′, ϕCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then S ∪ {ψCˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥. (A.2)
Now, suppose S |=CPL ϕ for some propositional ϕ. We will build a model M such that M is a -model for
〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 that does not satisfy ϕ.
LetM = 〈W,Ra〉 be such that W = valuations(S ), and Ra be such that for all w,w′ ∈ W , wRaw′ if and only if
• |=M
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ca such that |=Mw ϕi ; and
• |=M
w′ ¬ for all  such that a   and |=Mw ¬.
We have thatM is a-model, by the definition of Ra . By the definition of W ,M is a model of S . We have thatM
is a model of Ea and Ia , too: for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ca and every world w ∈ W , if |=Mw ϕi , then, by the definition
of Ra , |=Mw′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W such that wRaw′. Moreover,M is also a model of X a : for every ϕi → 〈a〉 ∈ X a and
every world w ∈ W , if |=Mw ϕi , then
Ea(w) = {ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea: |=Mw ϕi},
and
indepa(w) =
{¬: a   and |=Mw ¬}
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ϕEa(w) =
∧{
ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)
}
.
From this and (A.2), we have S ∪ {ψEa(w)} ∪ indepa(w) |=CPL ⊥, where
ψEa(w) =
∧{
ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)
}
.
As W is maximal, there exists w′ such that |=M
w′ ψEa(w)∧ indepa(w). As Ra is maximal by definition, we have wRaw′.
Hence there exists at least one w′ such that wRaw′, and |=Mw 〈a〉.
Hence,M is a model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and. Clearly |=M ϕ, by the definition of W . Hence S ,Ea,X a,Ia |=
ϕ. Therefore 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with satisfies Postulate PS. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 31
Let Iaimp be the output of Algorithm 2 on input 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and. If 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with satisfies Postu-
late PS, then it satisfies Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
Let 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 be an action theory for a with a dependence relation. For every Eˆa ⊆ Ea we define:
ϕEˆa =
∧{
ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa
}
,
ψEˆa =
∧{
ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Eˆa
}
.
Moreover, let indepa = {¬: a  }.
Lemma 53. If S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a) → [a]⊥ and S ∪ {ψEˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥, then there is χ ∈
NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) such that S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ) → [a]⊥ and a  i for all i ∈ χ .
Proof. Let S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a) → [a]⊥. Then there is a PDL-model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such that |=M S ∧ Ia
and |=M (ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a) → [a]⊥. This means that there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a and
|=Mv [a]⊥. From |=Mv ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a , it follows
S ∪ {ϕEˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥. (B.1)
From hypothesis S ∪ {ψEˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and Lemma 47, we get
S ∪ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥
and from this and Lemma 48 we have that there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) such that
S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥. (B.2)
From (B.1), (B.2) and classical logic, there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) such that
S ∪ {ϕEˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥ and S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
From this and Lemma 51 it follows that there is χ ∈ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ) such that
S ∪ {ϕ,ϕEˆa } ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥
and
S ∪ {χ} ∪ {¬i : i ∈ χ and a  i} |=CPL ⊥.
This and Lemma 52 gives us that for all i ∈ χ , a  i .
Now, because M above is such that |=Mv ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a , from this and S ∪ {χ} ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥, we have that
|=Mv ϕ ˆa ∧ ¬χ . Because |=Mv [a]⊥, we therefore have S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕ ˆa ∧ ¬χ) → [a]⊥. E E
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Postulate PI if and only if Iaimp = ∅.
(⇒): Straightforward, as every time S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥, we have S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥, and then Iaimp
never changes.
(⇐): Suppose that Iaimp = ∅. Therefore for all subsets Eˆa ⊆ Ea , we have that
for all χ ∈ NewCons(ψEˆa ,S ), if S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ ¬χ) → [a]⊥,
then there exists i ∈ χ such that a i . (B.3)
From (B.3) and Lemma 53, it follows that for all Eˆa ⊆ Ea ,
if S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEˆa ∧ indep′a) → [a]⊥,
then S ∪ {ψEˆa } ∪ indep′a |=CPL ⊥.
(B.4)
Suppose S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥ for some ϕ ∈ Fml. Then there exists a PDL-model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such that |=M
S ∧ Ia and |=M ϕ → [a]⊥. This means that there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕ and |=Mv [a]⊥.
(We are going to build a-model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉, and hence conclude that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥.)
For given w ∈ W , we define:
Ia(w) = {ϕi → [a]⊥ ∈ Ia : |=Mw ϕi}.
Because 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with satisfies Postulate PS, we can extendM to a big modelM′ = 〈W ′,R′a〉 such that
W = valuations(S ), and R′a is defined such that for all w,w′ ∈ W ′, wR′aw′ if and only if
• |=M′
w′ ¬ for all  such that a   and |=M′w ¬;
• |=M′
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea such that |=M
′
w ϕi ; and• Ia(w) = ∅.
By definition,M′ is a -model. We also have |=M′ S , by the definition of W ′.M′ is a model of Ea , too: for every
ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then |=M′w′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W ′ such that wR′aw′. ClearlyM′ is also a
model of Ia : for every ϕi → [a]⊥ ∈ Ia and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then Ia(w) = ∅ and R′a(w) = ∅.M′ is a model
of X a , too: for every ϕi → 〈a〉 ∈X a and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then
Ea(w) = {ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea: |=Mw ϕi}
and
indepa(w) =
{¬: a   and |=Mw ¬}
are such that S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥, where
ϕEa(w) =
∧{
ϕi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)
}
.
The justification is that S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥ would imply S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= (ϕEa(w) ∧
indepa(w)) → [a]⊥, and as long as ϕi → 〈a〉 ∈ X a , S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)). As by hy-
pothesis 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 satisfies PS, S |=CPL ¬(ϕi ∧ ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)), and then w /∈ W ′.
Hence, from S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEa(w) ∧ indepa(w)) → [a]⊥ and (B.4), it follows that S ∪ {ψEa(w)} ∪ indepa(w) |=CPL
⊥, where
ψEa(w) =
∧{
ψi : ϕi → [a]ψi ∈ Ea(w)
}
.
As W ′ is maximal, there exists w′ such that |=M′
w′ ψEa(w) ∧ indepa(w). As R′a is maximal by definition, we have
wR′aw′. Hence there exists at least one w′ such that wR′aw′, and then |=M′w′ 〈a〉.
Therefore,M′ is a model of 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and.
Looking at v ∈ W ′, we must have S ,Ia |=PDL (ϕEa(v) ∧ indepa(v)) → [a]⊥, because otherwise Ra(v) = ∅, against
the hypothesis that |=Mv [a]⊥. Hence, from (B.4) it follows that S ∪{ψEa(v)}∪ indepa(v) |=CPL ⊥, and then there exists
A. Herzig, I. Varzinczak / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 951–984 979at least one v′ such that vR′av′, and then |=M′v′ 〈a〉. From this it follows that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥. Therefore〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and satisfy Postulate PI. 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 37
Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfy PS∗. 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with  satisfies PI∗ if and only if 〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 and 
satisfy PI for all a ∈ Act.
(⇒): Suppose that S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥. By monotonicity, S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥, too. Now suppose
that S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there exists a possible worlds modelM = 〈W,Ra〉 such that |=M S ∧ Ia and there
is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕ and |=Mv [a]⊥. Let M′ = 〈W ′,R′〉 be such that W ′ = W , and R′a′ = ∅,
for all a′ = a, and R′a = Ra . Then |=M′ S ∧ I , and then S ,I |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥. Hence 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with does not
satisfy PI∗.
(⇐): Suppose 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and do not satisfy Postulate PI∗. Then there exists ϕ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |=
ϕ → [a]⊥ and S ,I |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥.
Claim. S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥.
Proof of the claim. Suppose S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥. Then there exists a -model M = 〈W,Ra〉 such that
|=M S ∧ Ea ∧ X a ∧ Ia and |=M ϕ → [a]⊥. This means that there is a possible world v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕ and
|=Mv [a]⊥, i.e., there is v′ ∈ W such that Ra(v) = v′.
(We extendM to all other actions 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 speaks of and obtain a-model of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉.)
Given w ∈ W , for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj → [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mw ϕj},
X ai (w) = {ϕj → 〈ai〉 ∈X ai : |=Mw ϕj}.
LetM′ = 〈W ′,R′〉 be such that W ′ = W , and R′ = Ra ∪⋃a′ =a Ra′ , where for each a′ = a and every w,w′ ∈ W ′,
wRa′w′ if and only if
• |=M′
w′ ¬ for all  such that a′   and |=M′w ¬;
• |=M′
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ Ea
′
such that |=M′w ϕi ; and
• Ia′(w) = ∅.
By definition,M′ is a model of the dependence relation. Because, by hypothesis, 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 with satisfies PS∗,
there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W ′, if Iai (w) = ∅, then X ai (w) = ∅. Then, as
W ′ = valuations(S ),M′ is a model of S . We have thatM′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea , and given a′ = a,
for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then |=M′w′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W ′ such that wRa′w′. ClearlyM′ is
also a model of I : it is a model of Ia , and given a′ = a, for every ϕi → [a′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then
Ia′(w) = ∅ and Ra′(w) = ∅.M′ is a model of X , too: besides being a model of X a , for every a′ = a and all worlds
w ∈ W ′ such that X a′(w) = ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra′ , because Ra′(w) = ∅ in this case would preclude
X a′(w) = ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as long as PS∗ is satisfied. Thus |=M′ S ∧ E ∧X ∧ I , but if
this is the case, S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]⊥, hence we must have S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → [a]⊥. (End of the proof of
the claim.)
From S ,I |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥ it follows S ,Ia |=PDL ϕ → [a]⊥. Putting all the results together, we have that
〈S ,Ea,X a,Ia〉 with does not satisfy Postulate PI. 
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 39
If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ if and only if S ,Ea,Ia |= ϕ →
[a]ψ .
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a-modelM = 〈W,Ra〉, such that |=M S ∧ Ea ∧ Ia and |=M ϕ → [a]ψ . This means that there is a possible world
v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕ and |=Mv [a]ψ , i.e., there is v′ ∈ W such that Ra(v) = v′ and |=Mv′ ψ .(We will extendM to obtain a-model of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and thus show that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ .)
Given w ∈ W , for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj → [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mw ϕj},
X ai (w) = {ϕj → 〈ai〉 ∈X ai : |=Mw ϕj}.
LetM′ = 〈W ′,R′〉 be such that W ′ = W , and R′ = Ra ∪⋃a′ =a Ra′ , where for each a′ = a and every w,w′ ∈ W ′,
wRa′w′ if and only if
• |=M′
w′ ¬ for all  such that a′   and |=M′w ¬;
• |=M′
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ Ea
′
such that |=M′w ϕi ; and
• Ia′(w) = ∅.
By definition, M′ is a model of the dependence relation . Because, by hypothesis, 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfies PS∗,
there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W ′, if Iai (w) = ∅, then X ai (w) = ∅. Then, as
W ′ = valuations(S ),M′ is a model of S . We have thatM′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea , and given a′ = a,
for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then |=M′w′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W ′ such that wRa′w′. ClearlyM′ is
also a model of I : besides being a model of Ia , given a′ = a, for every ϕi → [a′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi ,
then Ia′(w) = ∅ and Ra′(w) = ∅.M′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a , and for every a′ = a and all worlds
w ∈ W ′ such that X a′(w) = ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra′ , because Ra′(w) = ∅ in this case would preclude
X a′(w) = ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as long as PS∗ is satisfied. Thus |=M′ S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I .
Because there are v, v′ ∈ W ′ such that |=M′v ϕ, vRav′ and |=M′v′ ψ , we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ .
(⇐): Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a]ψ . Then there is a-modelM such that |=M S ∧ E ∧X ∧ I and |=M ϕ →
[a]ψ . Then, given a, we have |=M S ∧Ea ∧X a ∧Ia , and then |=M S ∧Ea ∧Ia . Hence S ,Ea,Ia |= ϕ → [a]ψ . 
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 40
If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉 if and only if S ,X a |= ϕ → 〈a〉.
(⇒): Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and satisfy Postulate PS∗, and suppose S ,X a |=PDL ϕ → 〈a〉. Then there exists a PDL-
model M = 〈W,Ra〉, such that |=M S ∧ X a and |=M ϕ → 〈a〉. This means that there is a possible world v ∈ W
such that |=Mv ϕ and |=Mv 〈a〉.
(We extendM to build a-model of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and then conclude that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉.)
Given w ∈ W , for each ai ∈ Act we define:
Iai (w) = {ϕj → [ai]⊥ ∈ Iai : |=Mw ϕj},
X ai (w) = {ϕj → 〈ai〉 ∈X ai : |=Mw ϕj}.
LetM′ = 〈W ′,R′〉 be such that W ′ = W , and R′ = Ra ∪⋃a′ =a Ra′ , where for each a′ = a and every w,w′ ∈ W ′,
wRa′w′ if and only if
• |=M′
w′ ¬ for all  such that a′   and |=M′w ¬;
• |=M′
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ Ea
′
such that |=M′w ϕi ; and
• Ia′(w) = ∅.
By definition, M′ is a model of the dependence relation . Because, by hypothesis, 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfies PS∗,
there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W ′, if X ai (w) = ∅, then Iai (w) = ∅. Then, as
W ′ = valuations(S ),M′ is a model of S . We have thatM′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea , and given a′ = a,
for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then |=M′′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W ′ such that wRa′w′. ClearlyM′ isw
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Ia′(w) = ∅ and Ra′(w) = ∅.M′ is a model of X , too: besides being a model of X a , for every a′ = a and all worlds
w ∈ W ′ such that X a′(w) = ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra′ , because Ra′(w) = ∅ in this case would preclude
X a′(w) = ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as long as PS∗ is satisfied. Hence |=M′ S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I .
Because there is v ∈ W ′ such that |=M′v ϕ and |=M′v 〈a〉, we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉.
(⇐): Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉. Then there is a -model M such that |=M S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I and |=M
ϕ → 〈a〉. Then, given a, we have |=M S ∧ Ea ∧X a ∧ Ia , and then |=M S ∧X a . Moreover, by definition,M is a
PDL-model. Hence S ,X a |=PDL ϕ → 〈a〉. 
Appendix F. Proof of Theorem 43
If 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗, then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ if and only if S ,Ea1,...,an ,
Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ .
Lemma 54. If S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ , then there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ →
[a1; . . . ;an−1]ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → [an]ψ .
Proof. Let S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ . In the case we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]⊥, the result
immediately follows. Then, given a model M = 〈W,R〉 of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 such that |=Mw ϕ for some w ∈ W , if |=Mw
〈a1; . . . ;an〉, there must be at least one w′n−1 such that |=Mw′n−1 [an]ψ . Take all such w
′
n−1 and let ϕ′ be
∨
|=M
w′
n−1
[an]ψ
w′n−1.
Then we have both S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an−1]ϕ′, and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → [an]ψ . 
Proof of Theorem 43. (⇒): The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 1. As 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfies Postulate PS∗, the result follows from Theorem 39.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;ak]ψ , then S ,Ea1,...,ak ,Ia1,...,ak |= ϕ →
[a1; . . . ;ak]ψ .
Step: let S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ . By Lemma 54, there is a classical formula ϕ′ such that S ,E ,X ,
I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an−1]ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → [an]ψ . From the induction hypothesis, we have S ,Ea1,...,an−1 ,
Ia1,...,an−1 |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an−1]ϕ′ and S ,Ean,Ian |= ϕ′ → [an]ψ . Thus S ,Ea1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ →
[a1; . . . ;an]ψ .
(⇐): Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ . Then there is a -model M such that |=M S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I
and |=M ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ . Then, given a1, . . . , an, we have |=M S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧ X a1,...,an ∧ Ia1,...,an , and then
|=M S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧ Ia1,...,an . Hence S ,Ea1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → [a1; . . . ;an]ψ . 
Appendix G. Proof of Theorem 45
Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗. Then we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ if and only if
S ,Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ .
Lemma 55. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and  satisfy Postulate PS∗. If S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉ψ , then S ,Ea,X a,Ia |=
ϕ → 〈a〉ψ .
Proof. Let 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfy Postulate PS∗ and suppose S ,Ea,X a,Ia |= ϕ → 〈a〉ψ . Then there exists a -
modelM = 〈W,Ra〉, such that both |=M S ∧ Ea ∧X a ∧ Ia and |=M ϕ → 〈a〉ψ . This means that there is a possible
world v ∈ W such that |=Mv ϕ and |=Mv 〈a〉ψ .
(We extendM to build a model of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and then conclude that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉ψ .)
Given w ∈ W , for each ai ∈ Act we define:
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X ai (w) = {ϕj → 〈ai〉 ∈X ai : |=Mw ϕj}.
LetM′ = 〈W ′,R′〉 be such that W ′ = W , and R′ = Ra ∪⋃a′ =a Ra′ (we extendM to all other actions 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉
speaks of), where for each a′ = a and every w,w′ ∈ W ′, wRa′w′ if and only if
• |=M′
w′ ¬ for all  such that a′   and |=M′w ¬;
• |=M′
w′ ψi for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ Ea
′
such that |=M′w ϕi ; and
• Ia′(w) = ∅.
By definition, M′ is a model of the dependence relation . Because, by hypothesis, 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfies PS∗,
there is no implicit static law, i.e., for every ai ∈ Act and every w ∈ W ′, if X ai (w) = ∅, then Iai (w) = ∅. Then, as
W ′ = valuations(S ),M′ is a model of S . We have thatM′ is a model of E , too: it is a model of Ea , and given a′ = a,
for every ϕi → [a′]ψi ∈ E and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then |=M′w′ ψi for all w′ ∈ W ′ such that wRa′w′. ClearlyM′ is
also a model of I : it is a model of Ia , and given a′ = a, for every ϕi → [a′]⊥ ∈ I and every w ∈ W ′, if |=M′w ϕi , then
Ia′(w) = ∅ and Ra′(w) = ∅.M′ is a model of X , too: besides being a model of X a , for every a′ = a and all worlds
w ∈ W ′ such that X a′(w) = ∅ there is a world accessible by Ra′ , because Ra′(w) = ∅ in this case would preclude
X a′(w) = ∅, and otherwise w /∈ W ′, which is impossible as long as PS∗ is satisfied. Hence |=M′ S ∧ E ∧ X ∧ I .
Because there is v ∈ W ′ such that |=M′v ϕ and |=M′v 〈a〉ψ , we have S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a〉ψ . 
Lemma 56. If S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ , then there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ →
〈a1; . . . ;an−1〉ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → 〈an〉ψ .
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 2. Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1;a2〉ψ . Then S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1〉〈a2〉ψ . For every model
M = 〈W,R〉 of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 and for every w ∈ W such that |=Mw ϕ, there is w′ ∈ W such that wRa1w′ and |=Mw′ 〈a2〉ψ .
Let ϕ′ be
∧{ :  ∈ w′} and the result follows.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;ak〉ψ , then there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that
S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;ak−1〉ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → 〈ak〉ψ .
Step: let S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ . Then we have that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an−1〉. By
the induction hypothesis, there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an−2〉ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |=
ϕ′ → 〈an−1〉. Because S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ , given a model M = 〈W,R〉 of 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 such
that |=Mw ϕ for some w ∈ W , there must be w′n−2 ∈ W such that |=Mw′n−2 〈an−1〉〈an〉ψ . Then we can safely take
ϕ′ as
∧{:  ∈ w′n−2}. Now, S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → 〈an−1〉〈an〉ψ . By the base step, there is ϕ′′ ∈ Fml such
that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → 〈an−1〉ϕ′′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′′ → 〈an〉ψ . Putting all the results together, we get
S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an−1〉ϕ′′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′′ → 〈an〉ψ , for some ϕ′′ ∈ Fml. 
Proof of Theorem 45. (⇒): The proof is by induction on the number of action operators.
Base: n = 1. As 〈S ,E ,X ,I 〉 satisfies Postulate PS∗, the result follows from Lemma 55.
Induction hypothesis: for any k < n, if S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;ak〉ψ , then S ,Ea1,...,ak ,X a1,...,ak ,Ia1,...,ak |=
ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;ak〉ψ .
Step: let S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ . By Lemma 56, there is ϕ′ ∈ Fml such that S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ →
〈a1; . . . ;an−1〉ϕ′ and S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ′ → 〈an〉ψ . By the induction hypothesis, we have S ,Ea1,...,an−1 ,X a1,...,an−1 ,
Ia1,...,an−1 |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an−1〉ϕ′ and also S ,Ean,X an,Ian |= ϕ′ → 〈an〉ψ . Then, this gives us S ,Ea1,...,an ,
X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ .
(⇐): Suppose S ,E ,X ,I |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ . Then there is a -model M such that |=M S ∧ E ∧
X ∧ I and |=M ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ . Then, given a1, . . . , an, |=M S ∧ Ea1,...,an ∧ X a1,...,an ∧ Ia1,...,an , and hence
S ,Ea1,...,an ,X a1,...,an ,Ia1,...,an |= ϕ → 〈a1; . . . ;an〉ψ . 
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